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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA KAY CLARK, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs . 
CECIL E. CLARK, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
CASE NO. 971635 - CA 
Appellee, CECIL CLARK, hereinafter "Mr. Clark" or 
"Respondent", submits the following Brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
Rules 3 and 4 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE and §7 8-
2a-3(2) (h) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant's 
(hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Ms. Clark") motions for a nunc 
pro tunc order, to supplement the findings and decree, and 
her objections to the order vacating the decree? 
A trial court's determination that it lacked subject 
1 
matter jurisdiction is reviewed on appeal for correction of 
error. Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1997) 
(citing Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 
1993)). 
2. If the trial court erred by determining that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, was the trial court 
within its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion for 
nunc pro tunc order? 
Trial courts enjoy "broad discretion" in deciding 
whether or not to enter an order nunc pro tunc. Home v. 
Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987). 
3. If the trial court erred by determining that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, was the trial court 
within its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to 
supplement the findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
decree of divorce and objection to the order vacating the 
decree and order of dismissal? 
Generally, trial courts may exercise broad discretion 
in divorce matters. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 
(Utah App. 1992) 
4. Is the one year requirement of §30-1-4.5 of the 
Utah Code Ann. constitutional? 
2 
"The challenge to the constitutionality of a statute 
presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness/' Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1262 
(Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Respondent submits that there are no statutory nor 
constitutional provisions completely determinative of the 
issues presented herein. However §30-1-4.5 and §30-4a-l 
UTAH CODE ANN. and Art. VIII, §5, Art. I, §2 4, and Art. I, §11 
of the UTAH CONSTITUTION are relevant to this appeal. §30-1-
4.5, §30-4a-l, and Art. I, §§11 and 24 are included in 
Appellant's Addendum, and Art. VIII, §5 is attached hereto 
as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. 
The trial court entered a Declaration of Marriage and 
Decree of Divorce on September 29, 1997. (R. 278-282). The 
Respondent appealed this order, case # 970635-CA. After 
this Declaration and Decree, Respondent moved to dismiss the 
3 
action in the trial court for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The trial court granted Respondent's motion 
On September 3, 1998. (R. 504-507). Petitioner moved for a 
stay, to supplement the findings, and objected to the trial 
court's order of dismissal. (R. 508-539). The trial court 
granted Petitioner's motion for stay and denied Petitioner's 
remaining motion and objection on December 24, 1998. (R. 
566-68). Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal of this 
order on January 19, 1999. (R. 569). 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent submits the following factual summary and 
hereby incorporates his Statement of the Facts as set forth 
in his Appellate Brief filed in the companion appeal to this 
case, case # 970635-CA. 
The parties were previously married. This marriage 
ended in divorce on August 27, 1985. After this divorce, 
the parties resumed living together. This subsequent 
relationship was found by the court below to have ended on 
August 28, 1996. (R. 267, Aplt. Add. 1). Petitioner filed 
her Complaint for Divorce on October 1, 1996. (R. 1, Aplt. 
Add. 2). 
As the parties and the trial court were very aware of 
4 
the one year time requirement under § 30-1-4,5,1 trial was 
expedited in this matter, and held on August 13, 1997. (R. 
267, Aplt. Add. 1). Judge Frederick entered specific 
findings from the bench on the same day as trial. (Aplt. 
Brf. p. 6, Aplt. Add. 3). The trial court also entered a 
lengthy minute entry on August 13, 1997, the same day as 
trial. (R. 238). All of this happened fifteen days prior 
to the one year limit of August 28, 1997. 
Petitioner failed even to submit her Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Declaration of Marriage until 
September 26, 1997. (Aplt. Brf. p. 6). The trial court 
promptly signed these documents on September 29, 1997. 
(Aplt. Brf. p. 6). 
Respondent filed an appeal in this Court on October 28, 
1997, which is currently pending in case # 970635-CA. This 
appeal was consolidated into the present appeal as case # 
971635-CA, by order of this Court on February 24, 1999. 
Respondent filed his Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss 
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction on May 4, 1998. (R. 
1
 On July 1, 1997, Commissioner Jones entered a minute 
entry stating that "the statutory limit on establishment of 
a marriage is looming." (R. 223). On July 16, 1997, the 
trial court set the matter for trial scheduled for August 
13, 1997. (R. 224). 
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419). Petitioner filed her response to the motion to 
dismiss and her motion to enter order nunc pro tunc on June 
3, 1998. (R. 445-449, 453-54). Both motions came on for 
hearing before the trial court on August 31, 1998. (R. 581, 
Aplt. Add. 6). The trial court granted Respondent's motion 
to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The trial court denied Petitioner's motion for a nunc pro 
tunc order. (R. 540-506). The trial court specifically 
acknowledged: 
It is my recollection that all [parties] 
recognized [the] severity, the potential severity, 
of the imposed deadlines in this statutory scheme, 
and we did, indeed, move the matter along 
expeditiously to have the matter tried within the 
one-year time frame. And it was accomplished. 
(Transcript from hearing on motion to dismiss,- R. 
581, Aplt. Add. 6, p. 13). 
On September 10, 1998, Petitioner filed her motion for 
stay and to supplement findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and decree of divorce. (R. 508). On December 24, 1998, 
the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner's 
motion for stay and denying the motion to supplement the 
findings. (R. 566-68). Petitioner filed her notice of 
appeal on January 19, 1999. (R 569-575). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
§30-1-4.5 clearly and unambiguously requires that a 
6 
common law marriage be established by order of the court 
within one year after the termination of the relationship. 
Here, it is undisputed that an order establishing a common 
law marriage between the parties was not entered within one 
year of the termination of the relationship, and that it 
could easily have been entered. Therefore, under the clear 
and unambiguous language of §30-1-4.5, the trial court 
correctly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction upon Respondent's motion. 
Because the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction in this matter, after August 27, 1997, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Petitioner's motions to supplement the findings and decree, 
for nunc pro tunc order, and objection to motion to dismiss. 
In fact the trial court had no jurisdiction even to 
entertain Petitioner's motions. 
Assuming that this Court finds that the trial court did 
have subject matter jurisdiction over this action after one 
year beyond the termination of the relationship, the trial 
court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the 
Petitioner's motions. The parties and the trial court acted 
as expeditiously as possible to ensure that the trial would 
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be held prior to the deadline. The trial court ruled from 
the bench and entered a lengthy minute entry on the same day 
as trial to assist the Petitioner in timely drafting the 
final documents. Petitioner had fifteen days from the date 
of trial to submit the documents to the court. The 
documents were not submitted until nearly six weeks after 
trial. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Petitioner's motion for nunc pro tunc 
order. 
Assuming that the trial court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner's motion to supplement 
the findings and decree, the trial court did not abuse its 
broad discretion in denying this motion. The Petitioner 
failed adequately to plead any of the alternate theories 
which may have originally been available to her. None of 
the elements of any alternate theories were even alleged in 
the pleadings, or at the full and complete trial in this 
matter. Therefore, the trial court was within its 
discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to supplement the 
findings and decree and objection to motion to dismiss. 
Finally, Petitioner's claims that §30-1-4.5 is 
unconstitutional are without merit. First, Petitioner 
8 
failed to adequately raise any constitutional issues at the 
trial level. Second, Petitioner was not denied access to 
the judicial system. She received a full trial on all the 
issues she raised. She won at trial. Petitioner was 
neither denied due process nor her right to equal 
protection. She was treated just as every other party to a 
common law action. Neither the Respondent, nor the trial 
court, nor the statute had any control over the Petitioner's 
failure timely to submit the requisite documents. The 
Petitioner received every protection that all common law 
litigants receive. Petitioner's own failure to take the 
reasonable steps to secure her remedy required the trial 
court to dismiss the action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE ACTION FOR LACK 
OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. 
"The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original 
and appellate, shall be provided by statute." Art. VIII, §5 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. The statute in question in this case is 
§30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code Ann., which requires that "[t]he 
determination or establishment of a marriage under this 
section must occur during the relationship described in 
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination 
9 
of that relationship/' (emphasis added). This is clear 
mandatory language. There is no room for the trial court to 
abuse its discretion as Petitioner has argued. "^When 
interpreting statutes, this court is guided by the long-
standing rule that a statute should be construed according 
to its plain language.'" Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918, 
920 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep't 
of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 1995)). "Thus, when the 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we will not 
look beyond it to surmise the legislature's intent/' Id. 
(citing Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1989)). Therefore, the trial court has subject matter 
jurisdiction, pursuant to §30-1-4.5, to enter an order 
establishing a common law marriage during the relationship, 
or within one year following the termination of said 
relationship, after this one-year period, the trial court 
loses subject matter jurisdiction. 
The trial court found that the parties' relationship 
terminated on August 28, 1996. (R. 551). Mr. Clark 
disputes this in his related appeal, but for purposes of Ms. 
Clark's appeal, this is irrelevant. It is undisputed that 
the trial court specifically expedited this case to ensure 
10 
compliance with the one-year time limit in §30-1-4.5. Trial 
was held on August 13, 1997, well within the one-year 
requirement. The trial court ruled from the bench and 
entered a lengthy minute entry on August 13, 1997. (R. 238-
39) . Petitioner had ample opportunity to generate and 
submit findings of fact and conclusions of law and a final 
order between August 13 and August 28, 1997. 
It is undisputed that Petitioner failed to submit the 
requisite findings or final order to the trial court until 
approximately September 26, 1997. (Aplt. Brf. p. 6). This 
was approximately six weeks after the trial, and nearly four 
weeks after the one year time limit imposed by §30-1-4.5. 
These documents were promptly signed by the trial court 
three days later on September 29, 1997. 
The Bunch case cited above, while not directly on 
point, does provide guidance in this case. In Bunch, Ms. 
Bunch sought to establish a common law marriage to Mr. 
Englehorn. Id. at 919. Mr. Englehorn moved to dismiss the 
action because there had been no court order entered 
establishing a common law marriage within one year after the 
relationship had ended. Id. The same as the Petitioner 
here, Bunch admittedly failed to obtain an order from the 
11 
court establishing a common law marriage within one year of 
the termination of the relationship. Id. at 920. The trial 
court concluded that, based on the requirements of §30-1-
4.5, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action 
and dismissed the case. Id. at 919. 
On appeal, Bunch argued that, because she filed her 
complaint within one year of termination of the 
relationship, she complied with §30-1-4.5. Id. at 920-21. 
This Court determined that this interpretation was contrary 
to the plain meaning of §30-1-4.5. Id. at 921. "Under the 
plain meaning of the statute, Bunch did not obtain a timely 
determination of her relationship with Englehorn." Id. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case 
based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 
921. 
This holding directly applies to the facts of the 
present case. Petitioner admittedly failed to obtain an 
order from the court establishing a common law marriage 
within one year of the termination of the relationship. 
Under the plain meaning of §30-1-4.5, Petitioner did not 
obtain a timely order establishing a common law marriage 
with Respondent, and therefore the trial court correctly 
12 
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF 
DIVORCE, AND OBJECTION TO THE ORDER VACATING THE DECREE 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL. 
As the trial court correctly determined that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over this case under the clear 
and unambiguous language of §30-1-4.5, the trial court 
correctly denied Petitioner's motions filed subsequent to 
losing said jurisdiction. See Bunch, 906 P.2d at 921. 
Petitioner's arguments alleging that the trial court erred 
by denying Petitioner's motions after the dismissal are 
without merit. 
Once the action was dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, Petitioner's only recourse lay with the 
appellate courts. Without subject matter jurisdiction, the 
trial court's only available course of action was to dismiss 
the case. See Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335 (Utah 1997) 
(affirming the trial court's dismissal of action for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction); Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 
P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993) (stating that a judge, acting in 
his/her judicial capacity, loses immunity from suit if the 
13 
judge acts without subject matter jurisdiction); Bankler v. 
Bankler, 963 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1998)(affirming the trial 
court's dismissal of action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
Petitioner argues that the trial court "erred in not 
granting [her] nunc pro tunc motion" because the statute 
"requires only a finding of good cause . . . ." (Aplt. Brf. 
P. 11). However, this argument neglects the trial court's 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner's argument, 
if accepted, would allow a trial court lacking subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter an order nunc pro tunc to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction over an action. This 
would be improper: A court must first have subject matter 
jurisdiction to enter an order. It can not enter an order 
to create subject matter jurisdiction. 
For example, in the Bankler case cited above, the 
parties were divorced in California. 963 P.2d at 798. The 
husband sought to modify the decree in the Fifth District 
Court of Utah since he had moved to Utah and the wife had 
domesticated the decree in the Fifth District Court of Utah. 
Id. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, as the California court had 
14 
specifically retained jurisdiction over the matter. Id. 
This Court affirmed the trial court. Id. at 801. 
Under Petitioner's argument, the Fifth District Court 
could have entered an order nunc pro tunc establishing 
subject matter jurisdiction over the matter prior to the 
California order, upon a showing of good cause. However, 
such would contradict the plain and unambiguous language of 
the Nunc Pro Tunc Statute which states: 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding 
of good cause and giving of such notice as may be 
ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter 
relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or 
annulment of marriage. UTAH CODE ANN. §30-4a-l 
(1998)(emphasis added). 
Therefore, Petitioner has erred in arguing that the "statute 
requires only a finding of good cause/' Jurisdiction is a 
clear prerequisite even to considering a motion for a nunc 
pro tunc order. As the trial court clearly lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Petitioner's motion for entry of a 
nunc pro tunc order to establish jurisdiction. 
III. IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT IT LACKED 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, THE TRIAL COURT WAS STILL 
WITHIN ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
15 
FINDINGS AND DECREE AND OBJECTION TO DISMISSAL. 
Trial courts enjoy "broad discretion'" in deciding 
whether or not to enter an order nunc pro tunc. Home v. 
Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987). In addition, 
generally, trial courts may exercise broad discretion in 
divorce matters. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah 
App. 1992). Assuming that the trial court had the subject 
matter jurisdiction required to entertain Petitioner's 
motion for nunc pro tunc order and other motions, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying said motions. 
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by not 
granting this motion for nunc pro tunc order because the 
statute only requires a showing of good cause. However, the 
language of the statute is not mandatory. The statute does 
not require that a trial court enter an order nunc pro tunc 
under any circumstances. The statute states that xv [a] court 
having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause" 
enter a order nunc pro tunc. UTAH CODE ANN. §30-4a-l (1998). 
The language of the statute clearly and unambiguously leaves 
the decision to enter the order in the sound discretion of 
the court. 
In the present action, where the trial court and the 
16 
Respondent acted expeditiously to assure compliance with the 
one-year time requirement of §30-1-4.5, the Petitioner has 
failed to establish any good cause for why she failed to 
submit the requisite documents to the court until six weeks 
after the trial.2 The trial court conducted the trial 
leaving ample time for the Petitioner to do so, ruled 
promptly from the bench at the end of trial, and entered a 
lengthy minute entry on the same day as trial to further 
facilitate the Petitioner's ability to submit the requisite 
documents. As the power to submit the documents timely was 
solely with the Petitioner, even if the trial court did have 
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, the trial 
court was within its broad discretion in denying 
Petitioner's motion for a nunc pro tunc order. 
Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in 
denying the Petitioner's motion to supplement the findings 
and decree. (Aplt. Brf. p. 13). Petitioner argues that the 
trial court should have supplemented the findings "to 
2
 "It is my recollection that all [parties] recognized 
severity, the potential severity, of the imposed deadlines 
in this statutory scheme, and we did, indeed, move the 
matter along expeditiously to have the matter tried within 
the one-year time frame. And it was accomplished." (Judge 
Frederick, Transcript from hearing on motion to dismiss, R. 
581, Aplt. Add. 6, p. 13) 
17 
consider and rule on the alternate theories'' of the case. 
(Aplt. Brf. p. 13). This motion was filed after the trial 
court had already determined that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Petitioner included the following sentence in her 
complaint: "These assets should be divided pursuant to 
common law principles and alternatively under the theory of 
partnership, contract for services or trust/' (Aplt. Add. 
2). However, none of the elements of these alternative 
theories were pled in the complaint. In addition, none of 
these alternative theories were argued to the trial court, 
prior to, or during the trial of this matter. Petitioner 
had ample opportunity to amend her complaint to specifically 
plead the requisite elements of any alternate theories from 
the filing of her complaint in October of 1996, until the 
trial in August of 1997. She had ample opportunity to 
submit evidence at trial to support these alternate 
theories. No elements of contract, trust or partnership 
were alleged in the complaint or testified to at trial. 
Petitioner cites Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177 
(Utah App. 1988), for the holding that "equitable theories 
of constructive trust or resulting trust doctrines would 
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apply/' (Aplt. Brf. p. 16). However, actually, this Court 
in Mattes found that there was no common law marriage and no 
constructive trust. Id. at 1181. This Court stated that 
" [a] constructive trust may be imposed if the grantee was in 
a confidential relationship with the grantor/' Id. at 1179 
(citing Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 
1983)). Petitioner never alleged any confidential 
relationship in her pleadings or at trial. 
Without any cite to the record to show where the trial 
court refused to allow her to submit any evidence at trial, 
Petitioner argues that she "has been denied an opportunity 
to present evidence and briefing on that theory." (Aplt. 
Brf. p. 16). Petitioner had ample time to brief any issue 
for trial and to submit any evidence at trial. Petitioner 
was never denied an opportunity to produce any evidence 
concerning any of her alternative theories. If she failed 
to do so, it must have been a conscious trial decision, 
which she only now regrets in hindsight. 
Petitioner also relies on Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 
504 (Utah App. 1989), to support her argument that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying her motion to 
supplement the findings and decree under alternate theories. 
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In Layton, this Court acknowledged that "an equitable 
division of property accumulated by unmarried cohabitants 
has been sustained upon finding a partnership, contract for 
services, and/or a trust." Id. at 505-506. However, this 
Court denied Ms. Layton's suggestion of these alternative 
theories as they were not adequately pled or sufficiently 
pursued at the trial level. Id. at 506. In addition, 
"[t]here are no findings or conclusions concerning any 
grounds for the property award other than a marriage-
equivalent under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 . . . ." Id. 
This is analogous to the present case. Petitioner's 
pleadings were insufficient to maintain an action under any 
alternate theories. None of the elements of partnership, 
contract or trust were even alleged in Petitioner's 
complaint. Further, Petitioner did not submit any evidence 
or testimony at trial to support any findings or conclusions 
with regard to the elements of these alternate theories. 
While it is clear that a trial court may consider these 
alternate theories under Utah Law, Petitioner is not 
relieved from her obligation to plead allegations sufficient 
to support the elements of these alternate theories, nor is 
she relieved of her obligation to submit evidence or 
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testimony to support a finding of these elements. 
Petitioner received a full trial on her complaint. Neither 
the trial court nor the Respondent kept Petitioner from 
admitting any evidence concerning the elements of trust, 
contract or partnership. In addition, Petitioner drafted 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the 
trial court in this matter. 
In viewing the circumstances of this case, assuming 
that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider 
Petitioner's motions, the trial court was within its 
discretion to deny Petitioner's motion to supplement the 
findings and decree and objection to dismissal, as 
Petitioner failed to plead any alternate theories, and 
failed to submit any evidence or testimony as to the 
elements of any alternate theory. 
IV. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING MR. CLARK'S ALLEGED 
BAD FAITH IS WITHOUT MERIT AND IRRELEVANT. 
Petitioner argues that some alleged bad faith on the 
part of Mr. Clark should somehow entitle Petitioner to the 
relief requested in Petitioner' s motions under equitable 
principles. Petitioner alleges that Mr. Clark caused delays 
during the litigation which caused the Petitioner's failure 
to file the findings and decree timely. This argument is 
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not based in fact or reason. 
The parties and the trial court were all very aware of 
the one-year time requirement of § 30-1-4.5, as noted above. 
Any alleged delay which occurred prior to the trial date is 
utterly irrelevant. Trial was actually held leaving ample 
time for Petitioner to submit the requisite findings and 
order. Petitioner carried the day at trial. The trial 
court ruled from the bench in her favor.3 
The only delay which caused this matter to be dismissed 
was Petitioner's delay. Petitioner was in sole control over 
when the documents would be prepared and submitted to the 
court. Trial was held on August 13, 1997. Both parties and 
the court knew that the documents had to be entered by 
August 27, 1997. The documents are not particularly complex 
nor difficult to prepare, and could easily have been done by 
the next day. In spite of this, Petitioner did not submit 
the documents to the court until September 26, 1997, nearly 
an entire month after the deadline. Neither the trial court 
nor Mr. Clark were responsible for Petitioner's failure to 
submit the documents timely. 
3
 This ruling is disputed by Mr. Clark in his related 
appeal. 
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Petitioner argues that, despite the trial court's 
alleged knowledge of Mr. Clark's bad faith, "the trial court 
refused to apply equitable principles and allow Plaintiff 
the opportunity to obtain a fair distribution of jointly 
acquired property/' (Aplt. Brf. p. 20). In fact, the trial 
court did everything in its power to assure that the 
Petitioner would have her day in court and be able to 
present her case. That the Petitioner failed to file the 
documents timely was solely in het power. The trial court 
lost subject matter jurisdiction and was forced to dismiss 
the action. Any prejudice to Petitioner in this matter was 
self-inflicted. The argument that the end result just 
"isn't fair" carries no weight. 
V. PETITIONER FAILED TO ADEQUATELY RAISE ANY 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL. 
"To assert constitutional claims on appeal, parties 
must generally assert them first in the trial court." 
Bunch, 906 P.2d at 921. Petitioner did allude to certain 
constitutional concerns in her Memorandum filed on June 3, 
1998. (R. 455). In addition, Petitioner also mentioned the 
possibility of constitutional issues at the hearing on the 
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motion to dismiss.4 Neither in her memorandum in the lower 
court nor at the hearing did Petitioner supply the trial 
court with sufficient legal analysis to permit consideration 
of weighty constitutional issues. 
In Bunch, this Court refused to consider the 
constitutional issues raised on appeal because: 
"The closest Bunch came to making a constitutional 
argument to the trial court occurred when the 
trial court asked counsel whether the facts of the 
case reflected any order that had timely 
established a marital relationship. Counsel 
responded that there was no order, but AI guess I 
would have some concerns about the 
constitutionality of such a statute when it would 
make it - when a person files a Complaint to have 
that determination made, and simply because of the 
delays and court time and that sort of thing, it 
can't get it to court.'" Id. at 921. 
Here, as in Bunch, Petitioner only alluded to certain 
constitutional concerns regarding possible equal protection 
or "open courts" issues. "There is no thoughtful or probing 
analysis of a state constitutional question . . . ." Id. 
Petitioner failed to raise any constitutional claims at 
the trial level to allow consideration in this Court. 
"Nominally alluding to constitutional questions ^without any 
4
 "One other area that I did brief, I'll just touch on 
briefly, and that is the Constitutional issues." 
(Transcript from hearing, Aplt. Add. 6, p. 8). 
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analysis before the trial court does not sufficiently raise 
the issue to permit consideration by this court on appeal.'" 
Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App. 
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991)). 
In addition, if Petitioner did attempt to contest the 
validity of §30-1-4.5 at the trial level, Petitioner's 
attempt must fail as she neglected to notify the Attorney 
General of the action. §78-33-11 states, in relevant part, 
that "if a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged 
to be invalid the attorney general shall be served with a 
copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard/' 
(emphasis added). This is mandatory language. The 
Petitioner failed to give any notice of any alleged 
constitutional challenge to the Attorney General. 
In Parker v. Rampton, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
the "propriety and essentiality" of including the Attorney 
General as a party to an action contesting portions of Title 
64 of the Utah Code. 497 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1972). 
It is a general rule that where legislation is 
assailed, the attorney general must be a party or 
given notice thereof by the way of service of 
pleadings upon him and where the proceeding is 
lacking in this respect, a declaratory judgment 
cannot be granted. Id. (quoting Anderson, Action 
for Declaratory Judgment, Vol. 1, Section 179). 
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This is the general consensus among other jurisdictions and 
authorities. See Torbin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361, 363 (Wy. 
1975) (holding that the failure to notify the attorney 
general about a challenge to the validity of a state statute 
was "fatal to this appeal"); Lakewood Pawnbrokers, Inc. v. 
City of Lakewood, 512 P.2d 1241 (Colo. 1973) (vacating a 
lower court judgment finding a city ordinance in conflict 
with a state statute on the basis that the attorney general 
had not received notice of the proceeding); see also 
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 275 (2nd ed., 1941) 
(stating that "[i]n several cases in which the validity of a 
state statute was either directly or indirectly involved, 
the failure to make the state or Attorney General a party 
was deemed fatal." (citations omitted)). 
Therefore, because Petitioner failed to raise any 
constitutional issues at the lower level adequately, 
Petitioner is barred from raising said issues on appeal. In 
the alternative, Petitioner's failure to notify the Attorney 
General at the trial level of a challenge to the validity of 
§30-1-4.5 is fatal to any alleged challenge. 
VI. $30-1-4.5 IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Petitioner argues that §30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code is 
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unconstitutional.5 "The challenge to the constitutionality 
of a statute presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness/' Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1262 
(Utah App. 1997) (citing Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 
1162 (Utah 1996); Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 
423, 424 (Utah 1995)). "[W]hen reviewing statutes for 
constitutionality, a statute is presumed constitutional, and 
Ve resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.'" Id. (quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 424 
(quoting Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 
P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993) ) . 
"Moreover, we will not hold a statute to be 
unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes a 
constitutional provision." Campbell v. Campbellf 896 P.2d 
635, 641 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Baker v. Matheson, 607 
P.2d 233, 237 n. 2 (Utah 1979). "We strive to construe 
statutes so as to uphold them as consistent with both our 
state constitution and the federal constitution." Id. 
5
 Assuming that Petitioner is successful in her claim 
that §30-1-4.5 is unconstitutional, her appeal is moot, 
since she relied exclusively on this provision to establish 
a common law marriage at trial in this matter. If 
Petitioner wins this argument, then her case must be 
dismissed. 
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(citing Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 934 n. 40). Petitioner has 
failed to establish that §30-1-4.5 clearly contravenes any 
constitutional provision. 
A. §30-1-4.5 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN COURTS 
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution declares 
that an individual shall have a right to a "remedy by due 
course of law" for injury to "person, property, or 
reputation." §30-1-4.5 did not deprive the Petitioner any 
access to legal redress in this case. Petitioner filed her 
complaint, performed discovery and other pre-trial matters, 
and was afforded a timely and complete trial. 
Petitioner cites the Berry case as analogous to the 
present case. In Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985), the Supreme Court of Utah determined that §78-
15-3 of the Utah Code Ann. violated the "open courts" 
provision of the Utah Constitution because it operated to 
bar actions without regard to when an injury occurred. 
In contrast, §30-1-4.5 does not bar any action. This 
provision merely limits the trial court's subject matter 
jurisdiction to actions where an order establishing a common 
law marriage has been entered within one year after the 
termination of the relationship. Therefore, no actions, 
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under §30-1-4.5, are barred on the basis of when an injury 
occurred. 
Petitioner argues that "[t]he right to apply to courts 
for redress of wrong is a substantial right and application 
of the one-year time limit to Plaintiff's case herein 
violates her rights of due process and access to the 
Courts/' (Aplt. Brf. p. 22). However, Petitioner was 
actually afforded her right to apply to the appropriate 
court in this matter for redress of any alleged wrong. She 
was duly afforded her rights of due process and access to 
the courts. Petitioner had the opportunity to bring her 
complaint to trial and submit any evidence and testimony to 
support her action. §30-1-4.5 did not serve to deny 
Petitioner her right, under the Utah Constitution, to access 
to judicial redress. Petitioner's own actions and omissions 
caused the dismissal of her action. 
B. §30-1-4.5 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
GUARANTEES OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution states 
that v'[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation/' The basic principle embodied in this language 
is that "persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarity, and persons in different circumstances should 
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not be treated as if their circumstances were the same/' 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
XN>In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article 
I, §24, we must determine whether the classification is 
reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislation are 
legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship 
between the classification and the legislative purposes.'" 
Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) 
(quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 637 
(Utah 1989)). "The burden upon a plaintiff to demonstrate 
unconstitutionality is a heavy one/' Id. (citing Blue 
Cross, 779 P.2d at 637). Therefore, Petitioner must first 
establish that §30-1-4.5 creates a classification scheme, 
and then establish that the legislative intent behind the 
classification is not reasonably related to a legitimate 
legislative purpose. Petitioner has failed to establish 
that the provision even creates any classifications. 
Petitioner argues that §30-1-4.5 creates "unreasonable 
classifications" because "[o]ne group can obtain judicial 
determination of their common law marriage within one year 
and another year (sic) cannot obtain this determination." 
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(Aplt. Brf. p. 23). However this is not an accurate 
statement. §30-1-4.5 allows all petitioners to bring a 
cause of action to establish a common law marriage. No 
classes are created by this provision on the basis of race, 
property ownership, sex, legitimacy, age, duration of the 
relationship, presence of children, or any other criteria. 
Petitioner seems to argue that the provision creates 
two classes: one class who has their common law marriage 
established within the one-year time frame, and one class 
which fails to meet the time requirement. This theory would 
allow any party who failed to comply with any statute of 
limitation or repose, or any time requirement established by 
the rules of civil, appellate or criminal procedure, to 
claim that the statute or rule in question created 
unreasonable classifications. §30-1-4.5 does not create 
this classification, and clearly does not when viewed in 
light of the facts of this case.6 The statute simply puts a 
time limit on the establishment of a common law marriage. 
Perhaps in a theoretical case where a trial court 
refuses to allow a litigant the opportunity to establish a 
common law marriage within the one-year time frame, the 
litigant may have an open courts or equal protection claim, 
however, in the present case the trial court bent over 
backwards to accommodate the requirements of the provision. 
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All petitioners are treated exactly alike under this 
provision. 
The type of time requirement in §30-1-4.5 is analogous 
to a statute of limitation or repose requirement. In Lee v. 
Gaufin, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations 
provisions of §78-14-4(2) were unconstitutional under 
Article 1, §24 of the Utah Constitution. 867 P.2d 572, 575 
(Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[s]tatutes 
of limitation are essentially procedural in nature and 
establish a prescribed time within which an action must be 
filed after it accrues/' Id. Further, statutes of 
limitation "do not abolish a substantive right to sue, but 
simply provide that if an action is not filed within the 
specified time, the remedy is deemed to have been waived 
unless the plaintiff did not know of the facts giving rise 
to the cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). "Thus, 
the barring of the remedy is caused by plaintiff's failure 
to take reasonable steps to assert the cause of action 
within the time afforded by the statute." Id. 
This is exactly the case at bar. While the case before 
the Court does not concern a statute of limitations, per se, 
it does concern a similar time limitation. Just as statutes 
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of limitation do not abolish any substantive right to sue, 
neither does §30-1-4.5. Petitioner was able to file her 
complaint and have her day in court. The dismissal of 
Petitioner's action pursuant to the provision was caused 
solely by Petitioner's "failure to take reasonable steps'" to 
comply with §30-1-4.5. 
In Bunch v. Englehorn, this Court declined to consider 
any constitutional issues regarding the one-year limitation 
of §30-1-4.5 because the issues were not adequately brought 
up at the trial level. 906 P.2d at 921. This Court 
mentioned in Bunch that "the statute might present a 
constitutional question in a different context . . . . [I]f 
a trial court were to enter a judgment denying a common-law 
marriage within one year of separation, and that judgment 
were reversed on appeal and the matter remanded, the parties 
might be denied a reasonable opportunity to comply with the 
plain meaning of the statute/7 Id. n. 3. While this 
specific fact situation may give rise to a constitutional 
challenge, these facts, or any facts similar, are absent 
from the present case. 
Petitioner has failed to meet her burden to establish 
that §30-1-4.5 is unconstitutional in any way under the 
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facts of this case. Petitioner was afforded her right to 
judicial redress for her claims. Petitioner received her 
day in court. The provision did not unreasonably classify 
the Petitioner. She was treated just as all other litigants 
bringing an action under §30-1-4.5 ought to be treated. 
Petitioner won at trial. Petitioner's action was dismissed, 
not due to any unconstitutional operation of §30-1-4.5, but 
only because of her own failure to submit the requisite 
documents to the trial court in a timely fashion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal 
of this action for lack subject matter jurisdiction. In 
addition, because the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
denial of Petitioner's motions filed subsequent to the lack 
of jurisdiction. In the alternative, Respondent requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of the 
Petitioner's motions and objection because the trial court 
was within its discretion in so ordering. 
Respondent also requests that this Court determine that 
the constitutional issues briefed in this appeal must fail 
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because Petitioner failed to adequately raise any 
constitutional issues at the trial level or failed to notify 
the Attorney General of any legislative challenge. In the 
alternative, Respondent requests that this Court find that 
§30-1-4.5 is constitutional as applied to the facts of this 
case. 
Respondent requests his costs incurred in this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 34 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of AUGUST, 1999. 
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ADDENDUM A 
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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Art. VIE, § 5 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by stat-
ute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme 
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of ongmal 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2; 
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to 
those in this section were formerly found in 
Art VIE, Sees. 7, 8 and 9 
ANALYSIS 
In general 
Appeal by the state in criminal cases. 
Appeal where case originated in circuit court. 
Appeals. 
City court supervision. 
Defendant's right to appeal. 
District court jurisdiction. 
—Appellate. 
—Original. 
Divorce decree 
Equity as distinguished from law case. 
Extraordinary writs. 
Final judgment. 
Habeas corpus 
Invoking jurisdiction. 
Juvenile court supervision. 
Legislative enlargement or abridgement of 
powers 
Review in cases at law. 
Review of evidence in equity cases. 
Right to appeal 
Summary appellate disposition. 
Temporary restraining orders 
Cited. 
In general. 
Although district courts of this state are 
courts of original jurisdiction, having jurisdic-
tion in all matters both civil and criminal 
which are not excepted by law or the Constitu-
tion, one district court has no power to exercise 
control over another Nielson v Schiller, 92 
Utah 137, 66 P2d 365 (1937) 
Appeal by the state in criminal cases. 
This section does not grant the state a gen-
eral right of appeal in criminal cases. State v 
Kelbach, 569 P 2d 1100 (Utah 1977). 
Cross-References. — Original and appel-
late jurisdiction, § 78-3-4. 
Appeal where case originated in circuit 
court. 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to entertain 
appeals from distnet court decisions where the 
case originated in a circuit court and involved 
a constitutional issue, Supreme Court's juris-
diction was not limited, as is its jurisdiction 
over appeals from a district court decision 
where the case originated in a justice court, to 
cases involving the constitutionality or valid-
ity of a statute. State v Taylor, 664 P 2d 439 
(Utah 1983). 
Appeals. 
The district courts of this state had appellate 
jurisdiction insofar as entertaining appeals of 
decisions rendered by board of registration of 
trades and professions revoking license of phy-
sicians. Baker v Department of Registration, 
78 Utah 424, 3 P 2d 1082 (1931) 
District judge who was called to another dis-
trict to try a case did not have jurisdiction to 
settle bill of exceptions in his home district. 
Jenkins v Forsey, 83 Utah 527, 30 P 2d 220 
(1934) 
Right to appeal is valuable and constitu-
tional right and should not be demed except 
where it is clear that right has been lost or 
abandoned Adamson v Brockbank, 112 Utah 
52, 185 P 2d 264 (1947) 
City court supervision. 
District court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over misdemeanor assault and battery prosecu-
tion; jurisdiction over the person was conferred 
by accused's stipulation that case might be 
transferred from city court to district court and 
his appearance in latter court, fact that prose-
cution was initiated by complaint rather than 
indictment or information did not preclude dis-
trict court jurisdiction. Jardme v Hams, 63 
Utah 560, 227 P 1029 (1924) 
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